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农学学报

农学学报 ›› 2024, Vol. 14 ›› Issue (5): 24-32.doi: 10.11923/j.issn.2095-4050.cjas2023-0074

• 土壤肥料 资源环境 生态 • 上一篇    下一篇

农村环境污染治理长效机制研究——基于演化博弈的角度

陈洁1(), 王贺2, 李玉2, 石常峰2()   

  1. 1 上海交通大学环境科学与工程学院，上海 201199
    2 河海大学商学院，江苏常州 213251
  • 收稿日期:2023-03-23 修回日期:2023-08-16 出版日期:2024-05-20 发布日期:2024-05-16
  • 通讯作者:
    石常峰，男，1985年出生，江苏扬州人，副教授，博士，主要从事资源环境政策与管理方面的研究。通信地址：213251 江苏省常州市金坛区河海大道1915号河海大学常州校区，Tel：0519-15195970975，E-mail：。
  • 作者简介:

    陈洁，女，2002年出生，福建福安人，研究生在读，研究方向：资源环境政策与管理。通信地址：201199上海市闵行区东川路800号 上海交通大学闵行校区，E-mail：。

  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金“实体水调度与虚拟水流动耦合视角下的水生态补偿模型研究”(41701613); 大学生创新创业训练计划项目“灰水足迹视角下黄河源区水资源承载力评价”(2022102941247)

Research on the Long-term Mechanism of Rural Environmental Pollution Control——Based on the Perspective of Evolutionary Game

CHEN Jie1(), WANG He2, LI Yu2, SHI Changfeng2()   

  1. 1 College of Environmental Science and Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 201199, China
    2 School of Business, Hohai University, Changzhou 213251, Jiangsu, China
  • Received:2023-03-23 Revised:2023-08-16 Online:2024-05-20 Published:2024-05-16

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摘要：

农村环境污染问题制约了城镇化发展，探索治理长效机制是目前农村环境治理相关研究的薄弱点，旨在弥补现有研究的不足。首先将地方政府、乡镇企业和农户三方作为博弈主体，建立农村环境污染治理的演化博弈模型。然后运用Python软件进行仿真分析，模拟三方主体的策略演化路径。结果发现，政府积极监管得到的奖励以及成本、政府消极监管成本以及由于消极监管导致的损失、乡镇企业积极履行环保策略的总收益及成本等因素都对农村环境污染治理长效机制的稳定性产生重要的影响作用。根据演化博弈探究结果，提出在法治机制、财政稳定投入机制、行政监督与奖罚机制、科技创新驱动机制以及多主体参与机制方面构建农村环境污染治理长效机制，并从博弈三方主体角度给出针对性政策建议。

关键词: 农村环境治理, 演化博弈, 长效机制, 三方主体

Abstract:

The problem of rural environmental pollution constrains the development of urbanization, and exploring the long-term mechanism of governance is the weak point of the current research related to rural environmental governance. This paper aims to make up for the shortcomings of existing research. In this paper, the evolutionary game model of rural environmental pollution management is established by taking the three parties of local government, township enterprises and farmers as game subjects. Then the Python software is used to simulate the strategy evolution path of the three parties. It is found that the incentives received by the government for active regulation as well as the costs, the costs of negative government regulation and the losses due to negative regulation, and the total benefits and costs of active implementation of environmental protection strategies by rural enterprises all play an important role in influencing the stability of the long-term mechanism for rural environmental pollution control. According to the conclusion of evolutionary game, we propose to construct a long-term mechanism for rural environmental pollution control in terms of rule of law mechanism, stable financial investment mechanism, administrative supervision and reward and punishment mechanism, science and technology innovation-driven mechanism and multi-object participation mechanism.

Key words: rural environmental governance, evolutionary game, long-term mechanism, tripartite subjects