Abstract:

The problem of rural environmental pollution constrains the development of urbanization, and exploring the long-term mechanism of governance is the weak point of the current research related to rural environmental governance. This paper aims to make up for the shortcomings of existing research. In this paper, the evolutionary game model of rural environmental pollution management is established by taking the three parties of local government, township enterprises and farmers as game subjects. Then the Python software is used to simulate the strategy evolution path of the three parties. It is found that the incentives received by the government for active regulation as well as the costs, the costs of negative government regulation and the losses due to negative regulation, and the total benefits and costs of active implementation of environmental protection strategies by rural enterprises all play an important role in influencing the stability of the long-term mechanism for rural environmental pollution control. According to the conclusion of evolutionary game, we propose to construct a long-term mechanism for rural environmental pollution control in terms of rule of law mechanism, stable financial investment mechanism, administrative supervision and reward and punishment mechanism, science and technology innovation-driven mechanism and multi-object participation mechanism.

Key words: rural environmental governance, evolutionary game, long-term mechanism, tripartite subjects